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CIVIL FORFEITURE UNDER 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7): THE PROBLEM
OF THE INNOCENT OWNER SPOUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970,1 codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881, "to deal in a comprehen-
sive fashion with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States."'2
Under § 881(a) (7), "[a]ll real property, including any right, title, and in-
terest ... in the whole of any lot or tract of land ... which is used, or
intended to be used, in any manner or part... [in] violation of this [coun-
try's drug laws]" is subject to forfeiture.3 The only relief afforded to an
owner of real property forfeited under § 881 (a) (7) is the "innocent
owner" defense contained in that section.4 The innocent owner defense
provides that an owner's property will not be forfeited if the owner estab-
lishes that the act or omission leading to the forfeiture was committed
without the owner's knowledge or consent.5
The innocent owner defense of § 881 (a) (7) is frequently raised by an
innocent spouse in order to prevent the forfeiture of marital property to
the government as a result of the other spouse's drug-related activities. 6
One federal court recently described this unfortunate, but common, situa-
tion as follows:
A husband's greed has destroyed a family. To turn a quick dol-
lar, the husband-unbeknownst to his wife-used the family
home to facilitate a cocaine transaction. The fruits of his endeav-
ors were swift but devastating. He is now serving a mandatory
ten-year prison sentence, and his family's home has become the
subject of [a] forfeiture action. 7
The purpose of this Comment is to provide a comprehensive survey of
how federal courts have dealt with the problems encountered under vary-
ing state property laws when one spouse raises the innocent owner defense
of § 881(a) (7) and the other spouse has violated the statute. This Coin-
1. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
2. HR. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.CA.N. 4566, 4567.
3. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
4. United States v. 11885 S.W. 46 St., 715 F. Supp. 355, 357 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
5. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) (1988).
6. See Lalit K. Loomba, Note, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property Forfei-
ture Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 FoRDHAm L. REv. 471, 490
(1989) (noting that innocent owner claims often arise when innocent spouses at-
tempt to avoid forfeiture of their property resulting from their spouses' narcotics-
related activities).
7. 11885 SW 46 St., 715 F. Supp. at 356.
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ment first provides a brief background of forfeiture law and 21 U.S.C.
§ 881. This Comment then reviews the innocent owner defense and the
conflicting decisions among federal courts construing the defense. The
remainder of this Comment surveys the forfeiture cases in which one
spouse has raised the innocent owner defense to prevent the forfeiture of
marital property due to the drug-related offenses of the other spouse.
This Comment examines and evaluates forfeiture cases arising in states
which recognize tenancy by the entirety, states which recognize commu-
nity property principles, and states which do not recognize either tenancy
by the entirety or community property principles.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of In Rem Forfeiture
The in rem forfeiture of property can be traced back to the Biblical
rule that "[i]f an ox gore a man or woman, that they die: then the ox shall
be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox
shall be quit."8 The principle of this rule was carried over into both the
Greek and Roman systems of law.9 The original objective of in rem forfei-
ture was to exact vengeance against property associated with wrongful acts,
as the property itself was considered the offender.10
8. See 0. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 7 (1881) (quoting Exodus 21:28);
see also Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169,
169-70 (1973) (quoting United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Coupe de Ville Two-
Door, 250 F. Supp. 183, 185 (W.D. Mo. 1966)) (noting that law of forfeiture is
more easily understood in light of Exodus 21:28).
9. See HOLMES, supra note 8, at 7-8. The Greeks developed the principle of
forfeiture into an entire system. Id. at 7. For example, animals and inanimate
objects that caused injury or death were "cast beyond the borders." Id. at 8. In
addition, slaves who killed or injured a person were given up to the relatives of the
deceased or to the injured party. Id. at 7. Roman law contained a system of forfei-
ture similar to Greek law. Id. at 8; see also Alice Marie O'Brien, Note, "Caught in the
Crossfire".: Protecting the Innocent Owner of Real Property from Civil Forfeiture Under 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 521, 524 n.20 (1991) (citing examples of
forfeiture in Roman law dating back to 451 B.C.).
10. See HOLMES, supra note 8, at 34. The property would be forfeited regard-
less of whether its owner was at fault, because the desire for retaliation was aimed
against the property itself. Id. But cf. Finkelstein, supra note 8, at 228 (stating that
Holmes' assertion that forfeiture of property was motivated by desire for retalia-
tion against property is not entirely accurate).
Despite Finkelstein's criticism of Holmes, modem courts continue to state
that the in rem forfeiture of property is based upon the fiction " 'that the thing is
primarily considered the offender.'" Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2808
(1993) (quoting Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921));
see also United States v. $83,900.00 in U.S. Currency, 774F. Supp. 1305, 1319 (D.
Kan. 1991) (noting that 21 U.S.C. § 881 continues to be based upon "the legal
fiction that the property itself is guilty of wrongdoing").
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In rem forfeiture was also firmly-rooted in early English common
law." Three types of forfeiture were established in England: deodand,
forfeiture upon conviction for a-felony or treason, and statutory forfei-
ture. 2 Under the law of deodands, the value of an inanimate object caus-
ing the death of a man was forfeited to the King as a deodand. 13 A
convicted felon or traitor forfeited all of his property, whether real or per-
sonal, to the Crown.' 4 These forfeitures were called forfeitures of estate. 15
English law also provided for statutory forfeiture of property used in viola-
tion of customs and revenue laws.16
Statutory forfeiture was the only kind of forfeiture to become part of
the laws of the United States. 7 Colonial courts enforced English and lo-
cal forfeiture statutes through the exercise of in remjurisdiction. 18 Later,
Congress passed its own forfeiture statutes.' 9 In rem forfeiture is now well-
established in American law.20
11. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-82
(1974) (discussing history of forfeiture at common law); HOLMES, supra note 8, at
24-25 (same).
12. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-83 (1974)).
13. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-81; HOLMES, supra note 8, at 24-25. The
word "deodand" is derived from the Latin phrase Deo dandum, meaning "to be
given to God." Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 n.16. It was believed that the instru-
ment of death was accused and required religious expiation. Id. at 681. The deo-
dand was forfeited to the King, and the King would provide money for masses for
the deceased's soul or put the deodand to charitable uses. Id. (citing 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300).
14. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682; Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806. Those convicted
of a felony forfeited their chattels to the Crown and their land escheated to their
lord. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806. Those convicted of treason forfeited everything to
the Crown. Id.
15. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2807 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*381). Forfeitures of estate were justified upon the principle that property rights
were derived from society and were lost by violating society's laws. Id. (citing 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *299; 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*382).
16. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682. The Court in Calero-Toledo suggested that
statutory forfeitures were "likely a product of the confluence and merger of the
deodand tradition and the belief that the right to own property could be denied
the wrongdoer." Id.; Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2807.
17. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2807; Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682-83. Deodands did
not carry over into the common law of the United States, and forfeitures of estate
were eliminated. Id. Article III, Section 3 of the United States Constitution pro-
hibits forfeiture for a conviction of treason, and the First Congress abolished for-
feiture for conviction of a felony. Id.
18. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683 (citing C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S.
133, 139 (1943)).
19. Id. Congress' early forfeiture statutes required ships and cargo used in
violation of customs laws, ships used to deliver slaves to foreign countries and ships
used to deliver slaves to this country to be forfeited. Id.
20. Henry C. Darmstadter & Leslie J. Mackoff, Some Constitutional and Practical
Considerations of Civil Forfeitures Under 21 U.S.C. § 881, 9 WHITTIER L. REv. 27, 28
(1987).
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B. 21 US.C. § 881
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970,21 codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881, "to deal in a compre-
hensive fashion with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United
States."22 Section 881 (a) originally subjected to forfeiture all controlled
substances manufactured or distributed in violation of the Act; all raw
materials, products and equipment used in violation of the Act; all con-
tainers for such property; all conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles and
vessels, used in violation of the Act; and all books, records and formulas
used in violation of the Act.23
Since its enactment in 1970, § 881 has been amended several times,
most notably in 1978 and 1984.24 In 1978, section 301 (a) of the Psycho-
tropic Substances Act,25 codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6), amended the
statute to provide for the forfeiture of all moneys, negotiable instruments
and securities furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled sub-
stance, and all proceeds traceable to such an exchange.2 6 Because
§ 881(a) (6) enabled the government to reach the immediate cash pro-
ceeds of drug transactions, 2 7 it was considered to be "a very powerful
tool. "28
21. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
22. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1 (1970), reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4567. The Act consisted of three titles: Title I, Rehabilita-
tion Programs Relating to Drug Abuse; Tide II, Control and Enforcement; and
Tide III, Importation and Exportation. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1236-37 (1970). This Comment
will focus on Tide II, which contains the civil forfeiture provision codified at 21
U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1992).
23. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and.Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, § 511(a), 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (1970).
24. For a discussion of these amendments and their significance, see infra
notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
25. Pub. L. No. 95-633, 92 Stat. 3768 (1978).
26. Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a), 92
Stat. 3768, 3777 (1978).
27. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6) (1988).
28. Forfeiture of Profits of Narcotics Traffickers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1980)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Ted W. Hunter, Chief, Special Action Divi-
sion, Office of Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Administration). Between 1978
and 1980, the DEA seized $7.1 million in currency involved in drug transactions.
Hearings, supra, at 8 (statement of William J. Anderson, Director, General Govern-
ment Division, General Accounting Office).
1354 [Vol. 39: p. 1351
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Despite the apparent success of § 881(a) (6),29 however, § 881 as a
whole was not meeting the government's expectations.3 0 Thus, in 1984,
Congress enacted section 306(a) of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act,3 1 codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7), which further expanded § 881 to
allow for the forfeiture of all real property used in violation of the stat-
ute.3 2 Section 881 (a) (7) was "designed to enhance the use of forfeiture
... in combatting two of the most serious crime problems facing the coun-
try: racketeering and drug trafficking. s3 3 Because these illegal activities
are motivated by profit, Congress recognized that law enforcement efforts
to eliminate them would not be successful unless the economic aspects of
these crimes were attacked.3 4 Congress believed that forfeiture was "the
mechanism through which such an attack... [could] be made."33
29. See Hearings, supra note 28, at 127 (statement of Ted W. Hunter, Chief,
Special Action Division, Office of Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion) ("The civil forfeiture provision of 21 U.S.C. [§] 881 (a) (6) is working well.");
id. at 18 (statement of William J. Anderson, Director, General Government Divi-
sion, General Accounting Office) ("Since 1978, section 881 has been used success-
fully to reach the immediate cash proceeds of drug transactions.").
30. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374; Hearings, supra note 28, at 8 (statement of William J.
Anderson, Director, General Government Division, General Accounting Office)
(noting that, although Drug Enforcement Agency seized approximately $7.1 mil-
lion in currency involved in drug transactions, it is estimated that $54 billion is
generated annually through drug trafficking).
31. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2050 (1984).
32. Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306(a), 98 Stat.
2050 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)). Section 881(a)(7)
provides
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States
and no property right shall exist in them:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (includ-
ing any lease hold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and
any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be
used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission
of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's im-
prisonment ....
21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7) (1988). The language of § 881(a) (7) allowing for the forfei-
ture of leasehold interests in real property was added by a 1988'amendment to the
statute. Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5105, 102 Stat. 4181, 4301
(1988).
33. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.CA.N. 3182, 3374.
34. See id. The Report notes that, "[today, few in the Congress or the law
enforcement community fail to recognize that the traditional criminal sanctions of
fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profita-
ble trade in dangerous drugs which, with its inevitable attendant violence, is plagu-
ing the country." Id.; see also Hearings, supra note 28, at 125 (statement of Ted W.
Hunter, Chief, Special Action Division, Office of Enforcement, Drug Enforcement
Administration) (stating that money is "lifeblood" of drug trafficking organizations
and must be removed).
35. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374.
5
Cornelius: Civil Forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(7): The Problem of the In
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
C. Procedure Under 21 U.S.C. § 881
Section 881 does not have a specific set of procedural rules designed
for use in civil forfeiture actions. 3 6 Rather, the statute provides three gen-
eral procedures for the seizure of property.3 7 First, § 881 (b) allows the
government to seize property "upon process issued pursuant to the Sup-
plemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. '38 These
Rules do not require the government to obtain a warrant based on prob-
able cause,39 nor do they require "a certification of exigent circum-
stances."4 Second, § 881 (b) also provides that the government may
obtain a seizure warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 41
Third, when the government has probable cause to believe that property is
subject to civil forfeiture, it may proceed under § 881 (d), which incorpo-
rates the forfeiture provisions of the customs laws. 42
Once the government has seized property, any claimants who come
forward must establish standing by proving that they own or have an inter-
est in the seized property. 43 "Ownership" of property for purposes of the
statute has been liberally construed to include "any recognizable legal or
equitable interest" in the seized property. 4 After a claimant has estab-
36. Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300, 1302 (4th Cir.
1992) (noting § 881 incorporates procedures of "more general application");
United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1262 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting
§ 881 lacks specific procedural rules).
37. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d at 1262.
38. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988).
39. Richmond Tenants, 956 F.2d at 1302.
40. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d at 1262 (quoting Rule C(3) of Supplemental Rules
for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, which allows court clerk to issue sum-
mons and arrest vessel or other property without certification of exigent
circumstances).
41. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988). Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires a judicial officer to make an ex parte determination of probable
cause before a seizure warrant will issue. Richmond Tenants, 956 F.2d at 1302 (dis-
cussing various means by which government may obtain seizure warrant); Livonia
Rd., 889 F.2d at 1263 (same).
42. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988). The forfeiture provisions of the customs
laws are codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-19 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
43. United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1500 (11th Cir.
1992); United States v. Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir. 1990).
44. United States v. 717 Woodard St., 804 F. Supp. 716, 722 (E.D. Pa. 1992),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 2 F.3d 529 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. All That Tract
or Parcel of Land, 762 F. Supp. 1479, 1483 (N.D. Ga. 1991). One district court
noted: "An ownership interest in property may be evidenced in a number of ways
including actual possession, control, title and financial stake." United States v. A
Fee Simple Parcel of Real Property, 650 F. Supp. 1534, 1541 (E.D. La. 1987) (citing
United States v. One 1945 Douglass C54 (DC-4) Aircraft, 647 F.2d 864 (8th Cir.
1981)).
Despite the liberal construction of the term "ownership," however, some
courts have held that mere possession of title to property without the exercise of
dominion and control over the property is not sufficient to establish standing to
challenge a forfeiture under the statute. See, e.g., Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d at 1444;
United States v. 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625, 630 (11th Cir. 1986). Courts
1356 [Vol. 39: p. 1351
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lished standing, the burden shifts to the government to show probable
cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture. 45 Exactly what
constitutes probable cause in a forfeiture action has been the subject of
disagreement among courts. 46
Once the government has met its burden of establishing probable
cause, the burden shifts back to the claimant to prove a defense to the
forfeiture. 47 The only defenses available to claimants are "that the prop-
erty was not used in violation of the statute or that it was so used without
[their] knowledge or consent. '48 The defense that the claimant's prop-
erty was used without his or her knowledge or consent is known as the
"innocent owner" defense.49
D. The Innocent Owner Defense
At common law, the "innocence of the owner of property subject to
forfeiture . . . [was] almost uniformly ... rejected as a defense." 50 The
rationale behind the common-law rejection of the innocent owner defense
was that owners who allowed their property to become involved in an of-
have also held that "[t] he future expectation of ownership by a child is insufficient
to give a claimant standing" under the statute. See, e.g., United States v. One Parcel
of Property Located at RR 2, 959 F.2d 101, 103-04 (8th Cir. 1992).
45. Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d at 1500. See United States v. Plat 20, Lot 17, 960
F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating government has burden of showing probable
cause); United States v. 890 Noyac Rd., 945 F.2d 1252, 1255 (2d Cir. 1991) (same);
United States v. Lot 9, Block 2 of Donnybrook Place, 919 F.2d 994, 997-98 (5th Cir.
1990) (same); United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir. 1989)
(same).
46. See, e.g., Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d at 1501 (stating "[tihe government
must convince the judge that it had 'a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, sup-
ported by less than prima facie proof, but more than reasonable suspicion.' ")
(quoting 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d at 628); Plat 20, Lot 17, 960 F.2d at 204
(using same standard); Donnybrook Place, 919 F.2d at 998 (stating that probable
cause is tested by same criteria used to determine probable cause for searches and
seizures); 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 621 (stating "[p] robable cause is defined as a
reasonable ground for belief in guilt."). See generally Darmstadter & Mackoff, supra
note 20, at 35-37 (providing general discussion of different standards courts have
adopted regarding amount of proof necessary to establish probable cause).
Despite the disagreement over the definition of probable cause, however,
courts do agree that probable cause may be established by hearsay. See, e.g., Ger-
mantown Rd., 963 F.2d at 1501; 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 621; All That Tract, 762
F. Supp. at 1482.
47. Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d at 1501; Plat 20, Lot 17, 960 F.2d at 204. A claim-
ant must prove a defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
48. Id. If the claimant fails to prove a defense to the forfeiture, the govern-
ment's showing of probable cause alone is sufficient to support a forfeiture. Don-
nybrook Place, 919 F.2d at 998.
49. See United States v. 116 Emerson St., 942 F.2d 74, 80 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing
United States v. 418 57th St., 922 F.2d 129, 130 (2d Cir. 1990), for proposition that
this is commonly known as "innocent owner" defense).
50. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974); see
also Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810 (1993) (stating that Supreme
Court has rejected innocence of owners as common-law defense to forfeiture).
1994] COMMENT 1357
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fense were negligent and properly punished for their negligence by the
forfeiture. 5 1 The absence of an innocent owner defense at common law
could often lead to harsh and unfair results.
52
In contrast to the common law and to prior forfeiture statutes, 21
U.S.C. § 881 (a) expressly contains an innocent owner defense in three of
its subsections, (a) (4), (a) (6) and (a) (7).53 The first subsection of § 881
to provide an innocent owner defense was § 881 (a) (6).54 The defense was
added to the statute by an amendment introduced by Senators Nunn, Ma-
thias and Wallop. 55 In adopting the innocent owner defense, Congress
intended that
property would not be subject to forfeiture unless the owner of
such property knew or consented to the fact that: 1. the property
was furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a con-
trolled substance in violation of law, 2. the property was proceeds
traceable to such an illegal exchange, or 3. the property was used
or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of Federal illicit
drug laws.
56
Six years later, Congress amended § 881 to allow for the forfeiture of
real property used in violation of the statute.5 7 Section 881(a) (7) in-
51. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2808-09. In Austin, the Court noted that this rationale
formed the foundation for two theories: the fiction that "the property itself is
'guilty' of the offense," and the idea "that the owner may be held accountable for
the wrongs of others to whom he [or she] entrusts his [or her] property." Id. at
2808. Both of these theories were used to justify forfeiture of the property of inno-
cent owners in cases rejecting innocence as a common-law defense to forfeiture.
Id.
52. See United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 624 (3d Cir. 1989)
(citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), as exam-
ple of case in which civil forfeiture led to harsh and unjust results because owner
had no knowledge that his property was being used for illegal purposes).
53. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2810
(stating that unlike traditional forfeiture statutes, § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) expressly
provide innocent owner defenses); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct.
1126, 1134 (1993) (stating that § 881 (a) (6) "contains an express and novel protec-
tion for innocent owners"). This Comment will focus on the innocent owner de-
fense contained in § 881 (a) (7).54. See Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301 (a) (1),
92 Star. 3768, 3777 (1978) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6) (1988)).
55. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 625. The purpose of this amendment was "to
make it clear that a bona fide party who has no knowledge or [has not] con-
sent[ed] to the [fact that the] property he [or she] owns [was] derived from an
illegal transaction ... would be able to establish that fact under this amendment
and forfeiture would not occur." 124 CONG. Rc. 23,057 (1978) (statement of Sen-
ator Nunn). See also 124 CONG. REC. 23,056 (1978) (statement of Senator Culver)
(noting that purpose of amendment is "to protect the individual who obtains own-
ership of proceeds with no knowledge of the illegal transaction").
56. Joint Explanatory Statement of Tides II and III, 124 CONG. REc. 17,647
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 9518, 9522-23.
57. Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306(a), 98 Stat.
1837, 2050, (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)).
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cluded an innocent owner defense identical to the one contained in
§ 881 (a) (6).58
E. Construction of the Innocent Owner Defense
The innocent owner defense provides that "no property shall be for-
feited ... to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner."59 The construction of
the phrase "without the knowledge or consent of that owner" has led to
conflicting decisions among courts applying the innocent owner de-
fense. 6° Specifically, courts are divided as to whether an owner asserting
the defense must show either a lack of knowledge or a lack of consent or
both a lack of knowledge and a lack of consent.6 1 In addition, some courts
have added the requirement that owners show that "all reasonable steps"
were taken to prevent the unlawful use of their property in order to prove
a lack of consent. 62
In United States v. 171-02 Liberty Avenue,63 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York first addressed the issue of
whether the phrase "knowledge or consent" should be read disjunctively
58. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (6), (a)(7) (1988) (providing for "innocent owner"
defense).
59. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(6), (a)(7) (1988).
60. See generally O'Brien, supra note 9, at 529-51 (examining conflicting judi-
cial decisions in this area and suggesting three-step analysis for application of inno-
cent owner defense); Brad A. Chapman & Kenneth W. Pearson, Comment, The
Drug War and Real Estate Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881: The "Innocent" Lienholder's
Rights, 21 TEx. TECH L. REV. 2127, 2176-83 (1990) (discussing different standards
adopted by courts construing innocent owner defense); Loomba, supra note 6, at
479-80 (noting inconsistencies in construction of phrase).
61. See United States v. Lot 9, Block 2 of Donnybrook Place, 919 F.2d 994,
1000 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting disagreement among courts and comparing cases
taking opposing positions on this issue); United States v. 8848 S. Commercial St.,
757 F. Supp. 871, 886 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (same).
Courts allowing an owner to show either a lack of knowledge or a lack of
consent follow a "disjunctive" interpretation of the defense. See Chapman & Pear-
son, supra note 60, at 2177 (labeling this approach as disjunctive); O'Brien, supra
note 9, at 529-30 (same). Courts requiring an owner to show both a lack of knowl-
edge and a lack of consent follow a "conjunctive" interpretation of the defense. See
O'Brien, supra note 9, at 529-30 (labeling this approach as conjunctive).
62. See, e.g., United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1505 (11th
Cir. 1992) (holding thatjury instruction regarding consent should make clear that
claimant is required to make all reasonable efforts to prevent illegal use of prop-
erty to establish lack of consent); United States v. 15603 85th Ave. N., 933 F.2d 976,
982 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating defense requires doing everything reasonably possi-
ble to withdraw from activity); United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 879
(2d Cir. 1990) (stating failure to take reasonable steps to prevent activity is "con-
sent"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991). See also O'Brien, supra note 9, at 543
(noting that courts are divided as to whether this requirement should be incorpo-
rated into statutory innocent owner defense).
63. 710 F. Supp. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
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or conjunctively. 64 In Liberty Avenue, the court adopted a disjunctive ap-
proach, allowing an owner to assert the innocent owner defense "where
the illegal acts giving rise to the forfeiture occurred without the knowl-
edge or without the consent of the owner."65 In adopting this approach, the
court relied on basic canons of statutory construction, which require that
the terms "knowledge" and "consent" be read disjunctively because of
Congress' use of the word "or.",66 The Liberty Avenue court stated that had
Congress intended the terms to be read conjunctively, it would have used
the word "and" instead of "or."67
The court in United States v. 141st Street Corp.68 also adopted a disjunc-
tive approach. 69 The 141st Street court found that both the ordinary mean-
ing of the word "consent" and basic canons of statutory construction
mandated this approach. 70 The court reasoned that "in order to consent
to drug activity, one must know of it."'71 Thus, if a claimant was required
to disprove both knowledge and consent, the term "consent" would be
unnecessary, as courts would never reach the issue of consent once they
concluded that a claimant had knowledge.7 2 The term "consent" would
then be rendered superfluous, a result that should be avoided under ca-
nons of statutory construction. 73 Several other courts have also adopted a
disjunctive approach, although not all based on the same reasoning.7 4
Other courts have adopted a conjunctive approach, requiring an
owner to prove both a lack of knowledge and a lack of consent to drug-
64. Id. at 50. See United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir.
1989) (noting that Liberty Avenue was first published opinion to address this issue);
Loomba, supra note 6, at 478-79 (same).
65. Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. at 50. Applying the disjunctive standard to the
facts of the case, the court in Liberty Avenue concluded that although the owner of
an apartment building knew of the drug trafficking on his property, he had raised
a genuine issue of material fact concerning his lack of consent. Id. at 49, 52. Thus,
the Liberty Avenue court denied the government's motion for summary judgment
and allowed the owner an opportunity to prove his lack of consent at trial. Id. at
52.
66. Id. at 50.
67. Id.
68. 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).
69. Id. at 878.
70. Id. The court defined "consent" as " 'compliance or approval esp~ecially]
of what is done or proposed by another.'" Id. (quoting WEBSTER's THID NEW
INTERNATIONAL DIc'riONARY 482 (1971)).
71. Id.
72. Id. Conversely, the court noted that it would only be necessary for a court
to determine if an owner consented if the court first concluded that the owner did
not have knowledge. Id.
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1503 (11th
Cir. 1992) (following plain language of statute); United States v. 890 Noyac Rd.,
945 F.2d 1252, 1260 (2d Cir. 1991) (following reasoning of 141st St.); United States
v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1989) (following reasoning of Liberty
Avenue). See also Loomba, supra note 6, at 485-86 (advocating disjunctive
approach).
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related activity in order to assert the innocent owner defense. 75 In United
States v. Lot 111-B,76 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit adopted this approach. 77 The court in Lot 111-B found that the con-
junctive approach is supported by the policy and intent behind the statute,
which is "to seize all property that has a 'substantial connection' to the
illegal drug activity."7 8 The court reasoned that this policy would be "sub-
stantially undercut" if owners who were aware of the illegal activity on their
property were allowed to assert the innocent owner defense based on lack
of consent.79
In addition to the disagreement over whether the phrase "knowledge
or consent" should be read disjunctively or conjunctively, federal courts
construing the innocent owner defense have also disagreed as to whether
the "Calero-Toledo defense" should be incorporated into the consent re-
quirement of the statutory innocent owner defense.80 The "Calero-Toledo
defense" is derived from dicta in the United States Supreme Court opin-
ion Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Company.8 1 In Calero-Toledo, the
Supreme Court noted that it might be unconstitutional to forfeit the prop-
erty of "an owner who proved not only that he [or she] was uninvolved in
and unaware of the wrongful activity [on his or her property], but also that
he [or she] had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
proscribed use of his [or her] property .... -82 Some federal courts have
incorporated this standard into the innocent owner defense, requiring
claimants who assert the defense to show that they took all reasonable
steps to prevent the illegal use of their property in order to prove a lack of
75. See, e.g., United States v. 15603 85th Ave. N., 933 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir.
1991) (relying upon legislative history in reading statute conjunctively); United
States v. Lot ll-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding property is sub-
ject to forfeiture if owner "either knew or consented to illegal activities"); see also
Chapman & Pearson, supra note 60, at 2181-82 (endorsing conjunctive approach).
76. 902 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1990).
77. Id. at 1445.
78. Id. (citing Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III, 95th Cong.,
2nd Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 9510, 9522-23).
79. Id.
80. See United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 879 (2d Cir. 1990) (dis-
cussing disagreement among courts as to whether Calero-Toledo standard should be
incorporated into innocent owner defense), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991);
United States v. 8848 S. Commercial St., 757 F. Supp. 871, 886 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(stating that courts applying innocent owner defense disagree as to whether Calero-
Toledo standard "should be imported into the consent component of the statutory
innocent ownership defense").
81. 416 U.S. 633 (1974). See also Loomba, supra note 6, at 488 (labeling dicta
in Calero-Toledo as "Calero-Toledo defense"); O'Brien, supra note 9, at 543 (same).
82. 416 U.S. at 689 (footnote omitted). The Court went on to note that, in
such a circumstance, "it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legiti-
mate purposes and was not unduly oppressive." Id. at 689-90.
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consent.83 Other courts, however, have rejected the incorporation of this
standard into the innocent owner defense.8
4
In United States v. 141st Street Corp., 8 5 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit concluded that the Calero-Toledo standard
should be incorporated into the innocent owner defense of § 881 (a) (7).86
The Second Circuit reasoned that, although the legislative history of
§ 881 (a) (7) does not refer to the Calero-Toledo standard, the Calero-Toledo
standard is "appropriate" for forfeiture cases because "it provides a bal-
ance between the two congressional purposes of making drug trafficking
prohibitively expensive for the property owner and preserving the prop-
erty of an innocent owner."
8 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit took the
opposite position in United States v. Lots 12, 13, 14 and 15.88 In that case,
the court rejected the application of the Calero-Toledo defense to the inno-
cent owner defense. The Sixth Circuit interpreted the statute as not re-
quiring claimants to prove that they had done all that they could
reasonably do to prevent illicit use of their property.8 9 Similarly, in United
States v. 171-02 Liberty Avenue,9 0 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York rejected the Calero-Toledo defense, stating that
"Congress could have written the relevant language from Calero-Toledo into
the statute," but did not.9 1
III. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The innocent owner defense is frequently raised by an innocent
spouse to prevent the forfeiture of marital property to the government as a
result of a guilty spouse's drug-related activities. 92 Spouses who assert the
innocent owner defense bear a "particularly severe" burden of proof "be-
83. See, e.g., 8848 S. Commercial St., 757 F. Supp. at 880 n.10 (noting that sev-
eral courts have held that consent requirement of innocent owner defense in-
cludes duty to take reasonable steps to prevent illicit activity on property);
Loomba, supra note 6, at 489 (same).
84. See, e.g., United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 879 (2d Cir. 1990)
(stating that many courts have rejected Calero-Toledo standard), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1109 (1991); Loomba, supra note 6, at 489 (same).
85. 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).
86. Id. at 879.
87. Id. The court also noted that incorporation of the Calero-Toledo standard
into the innocent owner defense was appropriate in light of its disjunctive con-
struction of the phrase "knowledge or consent." Id. The court reasoned that, once
a claimant has knowledge and asserts a defense based on lack of consent, consent
"must be something more than a state of mind." Id.
88. 869 F.2d 942, 947 (6th Cir. 1989).
89. Id.
90. 710 F. Supp. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
91. Id. at 50.
92. See Loomba, supra note 6, at 490 (noting that innocent owner claims often
arise when innocent spouses attempt to avoid forfeiture of their property due to
narcotics-related activities of their spouses).
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cause of the inherent difficulty in proving lack of knowledge" within the
marital relationship. 93 In addition, 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7) "contains no
suggestion that the burden of proving innocent ownership is any less strin-
gent when it is carried by a spouse seeking to retain marital property than
when advanced by a third party."94
The following three sections of this Comment discuss forfeiture cases
in which one spouse asserts the innocent owner defense to prevent the
forfeiture of marital property due to the drug-related offenses of the other
spouse. The cases discussed fall into two basic groups. The first group
includes states that recognize the marital estates of tenancy by the entirety
and community property. In these states, when one spouse raises the in-
nocent owner defense in a forfeiture proceeding, the courts have focused
on the issue of what interest, if any, of the innocent spouse is forfeitable to
the government. 95 The results of these cases have varied, depending
upon both the way in which courts balance the interests of the govern-
ment and the innocent spouse and the nuances of the particular state
property law involved. The second group comprises states that recognize
neither tenancy by the entirety nor community property principles. In
these states, when one spouse asserts the innocent owner defense in a for-
feiture proceeding, the courts have focused on the issue of standing; spe-
cifically, whether the innocent spouse has a sufficient ownership interest
in the defendant property to assert the innocent owner defense.96
A. Tenancy by the Entirety
"A tenancy by the entirety is a unique form of [property] ownership
[between a husband and wife] in which both spouses are jointly seized of
the property such that neither spouse [acting alone can convey an interest
in the property to a third party]."97 A tenancy by the entirety is based
93. United States v. 9818 S.W. 94 Terrace, 788 F. Supp. 561, 565 (S.D. Fla.
1992), aff'd, 983 F.2d 1083 (11th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. 15621 S.W.
209th Ave., 699 F. Supp. 1531, 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (stating that "[iln many in-
stances, the nature and circumstances of the marital relationship ... may well give
rise to an inference of knowledge of the spouse claiming innocent ownership"),
aff'd, 894 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1990).
94. United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d 659, 665 (3d Cir. 1989) (Green-
berg, J., dissenting); see also United States v. 116 Emerson St., 942 F.2d 74, 81 n.1
(1st Cir. 1991) (Campbell, J., dissenting) (stating that forfeiture statute does not
contain equitable defense on ground that it would be unfair to forfeit property of
innocent spouse).
95. For a further discussion of how courts have handled the innocent owner
defense as applied to spouses in states applying the principles of tenancy by the
entirety and community property, see infra notes 97-174 and accompanying text.
96. For a further discussion of how courts have handled the innocent owner
defense, asserted by an innocent spouse, in states not recognizing tenancy by the
entirety or community property principles, see infra notes 175-223 and accompany-
ing text.
97. United States v. Property Entitled in the Names of Alexander Morio Toki
and Elizabeth Mila Toki, 779 F. Supp. 1272, 1280 (D. Haw. 1991) (quoting Traders
Travel Int'l, Inc. v. Howser, 753 P.2d 244 (Haw. 1988)). The concept of tenancy by
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upon the common-law doctrine that a husband and wife constitute one
person under the law.98 Generally, five "unities" are required to create a
tenancy by the entirety: marriage, title, time, interest and control or
possession. 99
A tenancy by the entirety creates one indivisible estate in both a hus-
band and wife that neither can destroy by separate act.100 Thus, neither
spouse has an individual, separate interest in the property that may be
conveyed, encumbered or alienated. 10 1 Each spouse is considered the
owner of the whole property and entitled to its enjoyment. 10 2 In addition,
the creditors of an individual spouse cannot levy against property held as a
tenancy by the entirety to satisfy a debt of that particular individual
spouse. 10 3 However, a tenancy by the entirety is terminated if one of the
five unities is destroyed, 10 4 the spouses act jointly to terminate the estate,
the spouses divorce, or one spouse dies.105
Today, there are at least fifteen states which recognize tenancies by
the entirety.10 6 Federal courts construing the laws of five of these states
the entirety originated in the English feudal system of land tenures. United States
v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 972 F.2d 136, 138 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Oval A. Phipps, Ten-
ancy by Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 24 (1951)).
98. United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1990) (quot-
ing Rogers v. Rogers, 356 N.W.2d 288, 292-93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 947 (1991); United States v. 5205 Mount Howard Court, 755 F. Supp. 169,
171 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (quoting Hoffmann v. Newell, 60 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Ky.
1932)).
99. Leroy Lane, 972 F.2d at 138; United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894
F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990); Toki, 779 F. Supp. at 1280 n.2. The five unities
require that the joint owners be married to each other; the owners both have tide
to the property; the owners receive title from the same conveyance; the owners
share an equal interest in the property; and the owners both have the right to use
the entire property. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1514; United States v. 11885 S.W. 46
St., 751 F. Supp. 1538, 1539 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
100. Mount Howard Court, 755 F. Supp. at 171-72 (quoting Hoffmann v.
Newell, 60 S.W.2d 607 (Ky. 1932)).
101. Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 346 (quoting Rogers v. Rogers, 356 N.W.2d 288,
292-93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)). The consent of both spouses is required before
property held as a tenancy by the entirety can be sold, encumbered, leased, for-
feited or disposed. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1514.
102. Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 346 (quoting Rogers v. Rogers, 356 N.W.2d 288,
292-93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)); see also 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1514 (noting that
"each spouse's interest comprises the whole or entirety of the property and not a
divisible part").
103. E.g., Leroy Lane, 972 F.2d at 138; 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1515; Toki, 779 F.
Supp. at 1281.
104. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1514.
105. Toki, 779 F. Supp. at 1281. When the spouses divorce, the estate be-
comes a tenancy in common. Leroy Lane, 972 F.2d at 138; 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at
1514 n.2. Upon the death of one spouse, the survivor becomes the sole owner of
the property by virtue of the deed. United States v. 5205 Mount Howard Court,
755 F. Supp. 169, 172 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
106. See 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1519 n.9 (noting that District of Columbia and
14 states recognize tenancy by the entireties-Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode
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have addressed the issue of whether the government can forfeit property
held by spouses as tenants by the entirety when one spouse is an innocent
owner under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7) and the other spouse has violated the
statute.10 7 The decisions addressing this issue fall into three categories.
First, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh, Fourth and
Sixth Circuits have held that no present interest in the property could be
forfeited to the government, although the government may acquire an
interest in the property at a future time. 10 8 Second, the United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii has determined that the govern-
ment cannot obtain any interest in entireties property when one spouse is
an innocent owner. 10 9 Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has decided that the guilty spouse's interest can be forfeited,
with the innocent spouse receiving a life estate in the property." °
The courts that have held that no present interest in entireties prop-
erty is forfeitable to the government when one spouse is an innocent
owner under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7) have based their decision on the
unique nature of property held in a tenancy by the entirety and the impor-
tance of protecting innocent owners.1 11 In United States v. 15621 S.W
209th Avenue,112 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that as long as the entireties estate remained intact, the govern-
ment could not forfeit any of the property when one spouse was an
innocent owner. 113 The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by noting the
Island, Virginia, Vermont and Wyoming); Mount Howard Court, 755 F. Supp. at 171,
172 (stating that Kentucky recognizes tenancies by the entirety).
107. See United States v. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d 73, 75-78 (3d Cir. 1991)
(construing Pennsylvania law); United States v. 35 Acres, No. 90-7376, 1991 WL
154348, at *1-3 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 1991) (construing North Carolina law); United
States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 344-52 (6th Cir. 1990) (construing Michi-
gan law), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947 (1991); 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1512-20 (constru-
ing Florida law); Toki, 779 F. Supp. at 1279-84 (construing Hawaii law).
108. See 35 Acres, No. 90-7376, 1991 WL 154348, at *2; Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at
351-52; United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1516 n.6 (11th Cir.
1990). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 112-41 and accompanying
text.
109. See United States v. Property Entitled in the Names of Alexander Morio
Told and Elizabeth Mila Told, 779 F. Supp. 1272, 1284 (D. Haw. 1991). For a
discussion of this case, see infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
110. See 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d at 77-78. For a discussion of this case, see
infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
111. See 35 Acres, No. 90-7376, 1991 WL 154348, at *1 (affirming district
court's determination that special nature of entireties property prevented any in-
terest in property from being forfeitable to government); Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at
350 (stating that government may not alter nature of entireties estate by forfei-
ture); 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1515-16 (noting that innocent spouse has right to
own and occupy entire property subject to forfeiture and, therefore, no interest is
forfeitable to government).
112. 894 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1990).
113. Id. at 1512. In 209th Avenue, Carlomilton and Ibel Aguilera owned the
defendant property as tenants by the entirety. Id. Mr. Aguilera sold cocaine to an
undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency on the property and was later
15
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dual goals of § 881 (a) (7): "to punish criminals while ensuring that inno-
cent persons are not penalized for their unwitting association with wrong-
doers."'1 4 Next, the 209th Avenue court examined Florida's law of tenancy
by the entireties which mandated that the property interest of the inno-
cent spouse could not be forfeited to the government.1 1 5 The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the innocent spouse's property interest could not
be forfeited under the language of § 881(a) (7) because the innocent
spouse's interest in the estate was "an indivisible right to own and occupy
the entire property."116
The court in 209th Avenue rejected the government's argument that
the "relation back" provision of § 881117 operated to convert an entireties
estate into a tenancy in common, permitting the government to sell the
property and split the proceeds with the innocent spouse.118 The Elev-
enth Circuit stated that such a result would give the government a greater
interest than that possessed by the guilty spouse because the guilty spouse
could only sell the property in concert with the innocent spouse.119
convicted for trafficking in cocaine. Id. The government then filed a complaint
for forfeiture of the property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7). Id. Mrs. Aguilera
entered the forfeiture proceeding claiming to be an innocent owner. Id. at 1512-
13. The district court found Mrs. Aguilera to be an innocent owner and held that
the property was not subject to forfeiture because an entireties estate cannot be
forfeited due to the independent criminal conduct of one spouse under Florida
law. Id. at 1513.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1514-15. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Mrs. Aguilera, as an
innocent owner, held an interest in the land as a tenant by the entireties. Id. at
1515.
116. Id. The court noted that the district court had correctly decided the
case, although it used different reasoning. Id.
117. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988). This section provides that "[a]ll right,
title, and interest in property... shall vest in the United States upon commission
of the act giving rise to forfeiture ...... Id.
118. United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1515 (11th Cir.
1990). In 209th Avenue, the government argued that under the relation back sec-
tion, when the guilty spouse sold the cocaine, the government replaced the guilty
spouse as co-owner of the property with the innocent spouse. Id. This would have
the effect of terminating the entireties estate and converting it into a tenancy in
common. Id.
Today, it is unlikely that the government could make this argument due to the
United States Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. 92 Buena Vista
Avenue, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993). In Buena Vista, the Court held that the relation
back doctrine of 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) does not take effect until after there has been
a judgment of forfeiture against the property. Id. at 1137. Thus, the Buena Vista
holding seems to render the government's "relation back" claim invalid.
119. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1516. If the government was a tenant in common
with the innocent spouse, it would have "the right to freely alienate its half-interest
of the property and the right to force partition on its co-tenant-a far greater
interest than that possessed by [the guilty spouse]." Id. The court also noted that
converting the entireties estate into a tenancy in common would be a taking with-
out due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the government's argument that,
in this case, federal law should preempt state law. 120 The government ar-
gued that Florida's law of tenancy by the entireties directly conflicts with
federal forfeiture law and frustrates its goals.1 21 The court replied that
none of the grounds requiring federal preemption of state law affected
the outcome of the case. 122 Further, the court emphasized that the clear
language of § 881 (a) (7) protected the property interests of innocent own-
ers and noted that a uniform federal rule of decision would blatantly disre-
gard the express terms of the statute.' 2 3
The Eleventh Circuit in 209th Avenue ultimately concluded: "using
Florida law to define what property interest each of the... [spouses] has,
we find that no interest exists in the subject property which can be for-
feited to the government at the present time."' 2 4 The court noted, how-
ever, that "[n] othing would prevent the government from attempting to
execute or levy on its interest should the entireties estate be altered by
changes in circumstances or by court order."' 2 5 Thus, the government
could file a lis pendens against the property and acquire the guilty spouse's
interest in a later forfeiture proceeding without affecting the innocent
spouse's rights.' 2 6
In an unpublished opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit also held that property owned as a tenancy by the en-
120. Id. at 1517.
121. Id. The government also argued that the district court should have
adopted a uniform federal rule allowing the United States to forfeit one half of all
property owned jointly by spouses where only one spouse is involved in drug traf-
ficking activities. Id.
122. Id. at 1518. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed a series of United States
Supreme Court cases which have held that federal law will preempt state law only
if Congress expressly provides for preemption, if the area of law is one of
comprehensive federal regulation that leaves no room for state laws to
supplement, if the state law affects a field of dominant federal interest
precluding state laws on the same subject, or if the state law and the fed-
eral law are in actual conflict so that compliance with both is physically
impossible or the state law obstructs the accomplishment of the full
objectives of Congress.
Id. at 1517. The Eleventh Circuit determined that 21 U.S.C. § 881 contains no
express preemption, nor is it an example of a field in which federal regulation
excludes state law. Id. at 1518. The court also noted that there was no conflict
between Florida law and federal law and that "Florida law merely defines the inter-
ests of owners of property." Id.
123. Id. at 1518-19. The Eleventh Circuit also concluded that a federal rule
was unnecessary because, in most cases, "the application of state property law to
define what is and is not forfeitable will not adversely affect the federal interest in
effecting forfeiture." Id. at 1519.
124. Id. at 1516; see also United States v. 11885 S.W. 46 St., 751 F. Supp. 1538,
1539-40 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (entering final judgment consistent with Eleventh Cir-
cuit's opinion in 209th Avenue).
125. United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1516 n.6 (11th
Cir. 1990). For a discussion of the changes in circumstances that alter a tenancy by
the entirety, see supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
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tirety is not immediately forfeitable to the government when one spouse is
an innocent owner. 127 In United States v. 35 Acres,128 the Fourth Circuit
adopted the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in 209th Avenue.129 The
Fourth Circuit held that, although a tenancy by the entirety prevents an
immediate forfeiture of the property to the government, the guilty
spouse's interest may be forfeitable in the future if the entireties estate is
altered. 130
In United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane,13 ' the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit reached a result similar to that of the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in 209th Avenue. The court in Leroy Lane held that when
the government seeks forfeiture of property held as a tenancy by the en-
tirety and one spouse is an innocent owner, the government acquires an
interest analogous to that of a judgment creditor of one spouse. 132 Next,
the Sixth Circuit examined Michigan law to determine the property inter-
est of the innocent spouse under § 881 (a) (7).133 The court determined
that the government could only acquire the interest the guilty spouse had
127. United States v. 35 Acres, No. 90-7376, 1991 WL 154348, at *3 (4th Cir.
Aug. 15, 1991). In 35 Acres, Charles McHan pled guilty to conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute marijuana. Id. at *1. The government then filed a forfei-
ture action under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) against the property that Mr. McHan and
his wife owned as tenants by the entirety. Id.
128. No. 90-7376, 1991 WL 154348 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 1991).
129. Id. at *2.
130. Id.
131. 910 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947 (1991).
132. Id. at 351. In Leroy Lane, Mitchell and Leah Marks owned the defendant
property as tenants by the entirety. Id. at 345. Mr. Marks was convicted for distri-
bution of cocaine. Id. The judgment order imposing sentence ordered forfeiture
of his interest in the property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (2), the forfeiture
provision of the criminal statute under which he was convicted. Id. While Mr.
Marks' criminal prosecution was pending, the government filed a civil complaint
for forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7). Id. Mrs. Marks then filed a claim of
interest in the property. Id. The civil and criminal forfeiture actions were later
consolidated. Id. The. district court found that Mrs. Marks was an innocent owner
under § 881(a) (7) and held that her innocent owner status operated to avoid for-
feiture of the property. Id.
133. Id. at 346-47. Like the Eleventh Circuit in 209th Avenue, the Sixth Circuit
in Leroy Lane rejected the government's argument that the federal courts should
develop a federal common law of forfeiture to govern the treatment of property
interests. Id. at 347-49. The court noted that forfeiture actions involve property
rights traditionally defined by state law. Id. at 349. The court also pointed out that
the forfeiture provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 881 do not contain rules of law defining the
scope of an innocent owner's property rights, indicating that Congress had not
expressly preempted the area. Id. Thus, the court reasoned that it was appropri-
ate to refer to state law to define an innocent owner's property interest under 21
U.S.C. § 881. Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Krupansky argued that, in this case, a federal
common law of forfeiture should preempt state law. Id. at 353 (Krupansky, J., dis-
senting). Judge Krupansky stated that a federal common law addressing the forfei-
ture of marital property should be developed so as to preempt the "contrary
provisions of the myriad spousal estates recognized in the various states." Id. at 354
(Krupansky, J., dissenting).
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in the entireties estate.' 34 However, the government could not actually
obtain this property interest until the entireties estate was terminated.' 3 5
Thus, the court concluded that the government would acquire an interest
analogous to a judgment creditor in the entireties property.'3 6
The Sixth Circuit claimed that its opinion in Leroy Lanewas consistent
with the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in 209th Avenue.'3 7 The court
noted that the only difference was that the property in 209th Avenue had
not been sold.13 8 Thus, in 209th Avenue, the government's interest in the
entireties property was protected by the filing of a lis pendens against the
property.' 3 9 In Leroy Lane, however, the proceeds from the sale of the
entireties property were held in escrow to protect the government's inter-
est in the property."4° The court in Leroy Lane stated that "in effect" the
escrow account established a lis pendens against the entireties property.' 4 '
In United States v. Property Entitled in the Names of Alexander Morio Toki
and Elizabeth Mila Toki,142 the United States District Court for the District
134. Id. at 351. The court rejected the government's argument that the rela-
tion back provision of 21 U.S.C. § 881 converted the entireties estate into a ten-
ancy in common, allowing the government to assume ownership of the entire
property. Id. at 350. The court in Leroy Lane held that the relation back provision
would vest the government with a greater interest in the estate than that held by
the guilty spouse and would not adequately compensate the innocent spouse's in-
terest. Id. This same argument was also considered and rejected by the Eleventh
Circuit in 209th Avenue. See United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511,
1515-16 (11th Cir. 1990). For a discussion of the relation back argument made in
209th Avenue, see supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Krupansky advocated a severance of the en-
tireties estate and the creation of a tenancy in common between the innocent
spouse and the government. Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 356 (Krupansky, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Krupansky stated that this solution would serve both the governmental
interest in forfeiture and the property interest of the innocent spouse. Id.
(Krupansky, J., dissenting).
135. 910 F.2d at 351. The court held that the government could not pres-
endy obtain the guilty spouse's interest in the entireties property because entireties
estates are founded on a marital union, and the government could not assume the
role of spouse to the innocent owner. Id. Thus, the government would have to
wait until the entireties estate was terminated to obtain its interest in the property.
Id.
136. Id. Because the property had been sold while the forfeiture action was
pending, the court defined the government's interest in the entireties property as
analogous to that of a judgment creditor. Id. The parties agreed to treat the pro-
ceeds of the sale as a substitute res which retained the same qualities as entireties
property. Id. at 345, 351. Had the property not been sold, the innocent spouse
would have been entitled to live in the house for the duration of the tenancy, and
the government would have had a lien on the property equivalent to the value of
the guilty spouse's interest in the property. Id. at 351.
137. Id. at 352. For a discussion of the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in
209th Avenue, see supra notes 112-26 and accompanying text.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 779 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Haw. 1991).
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of Hawaii reached a different result than the results of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in 209th Avenue and the Sixth Circuit in Leroy Lane. The Toki court
held that, under Hawaii law, the government cannot obtain any interest in entire-
ties property when one spouse is an innocent owner.143
The court in Toki began its analysis by citing 209th Avenue and Leroy
Lane. 44 The court stated that these cases establish that the government
cannot forfeit a guilty spouse's interest in entireties property, but that it
acquires the right to file a lispendensor a lien against the property. 145 The
court in Toki, however, stated that differences in Hawaii's law of tenancy by
the entirety precluded the government from filing a lis pendens or acquir-
ing a lien against entireties property.146 Thus, the court concluded that,
under Hawaii law, the government could not obtain any interest in entire-
ties property when one spouse was an innocent owner. 147
Through a balancing of interests test, one court has held that a guilty
spouse's interest in entireties property can be forfeited, with the innocent
spouse receiving a life estate in the property. 148 In United States v. 1500
Lincoln Avenue,149 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
stated that it wished to "adopt the interpretation that best serves the two
intended goals of 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7): forfeiture of the property used in
committing drug offenses and preservation of the property rights of inno-
cent owners."1 50 In 1500 Lincoln Avenue, the court held that the immedi-
143. Id. at 1284. In To/i, the defendant property was owned by Alexander
Told and Elizabeth Told as tenants by the entirety. Id. at 1274. Mr. Told pled
guilty to possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Id. at 1275. Thereafter,
the government filed an action to forfeit the property. Id. Mrs. Told then asserted
her interest in the property and claimed to be an innocent owner. Id.
144. Id. at 1281-82. For a discussion of 209th Avenue, see supra notes 112-26
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Leroy Lane, see supra notes 131-41 and
accompanying text.
145. Id. at 1282.
146. Id. at 1284. In support of this proposition, the court cited a Hawaii
Supreme Court decision finding that "property held as tenants by the entirety may
be conveyed free and clear of any levy, lien, or s pendens due to a judgment
against one spouse." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291
(Haw. 1977)).
147. Id. The court in Toki stated that the government was "relegated to a
position analogous to that of an unsecured judgment creditor of the non-innocent
spouse." Id.
148. United States v. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d 73, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1991). In
1500 Lincoln Avenue, A. Leonard Bernstein and Linda Bernstein owned a pharmacy
as tenants by the entireties. Id. at 74. Mr. Bernstein was convicted of several drug-
related offenses for selling controlled substances without a prescription. Id. at 75.
Mrs. Bernstein asserted, and the government conceded, that she was an innocent
owner. Id. The district court, following the Eleventh Circuit decision in 209th
Avenue, held that no interest in the entireties property was forfeitable to the gov-
ernment. Id. However, the district court held that the government could file a is
pendens against the property. Id.
149. 949 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1991).
150. Id. at 77. The court in 1500 Lincoln Avenue noted that the legislative
history of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) provides no guidance as to how the government's
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ate forfeiture of the guilty spouse's interest would serve the goal of
forfeiting property used in drug offenses, while allowing the innocent
spouse to have a life estate in the entireties property would serve the com-
peting goal of protecting the property of innocent owners.' 51
The Third Circuit in 1500 Lincoln Avenue rejected the approach taken
by the Eleventh Circuit in 209th Avenue as not serving the dual goals of 21
U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7).152 The court stated that the Eleventh Circuit ap-
proach of denying forfeiture but allowing the government to file a Iis
pendens against the property "frustrates the strong governmental interest
in forfeiture [because] it permits a guilty spouse during his or her lifetime
to retain title as a tenant by the entireties in property that he or she has
used in illegal drug activities."' 53 Furthermore, the court noted that the
Eleventh Circuit approach creates "substantial procedural difficulties" by
requiring the government to postpone forfeiture actions until the guilty
spouse acquires a separate interest in the entireties property. 154 Thus, the
court in 1500 Lincoln Avenue concluded that its approach best served the
dual purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7).155
B. Community Property
Community property is defined as "property owned in common by
husband and wife with each having an undivided one-half interest."' 56
The basic principle of the community property system is that "all property
acquired during marriage by the industry and labor of either spouse or
both spouses together... belongs beneficially to both during the continu-
ance of the marriage relation."157 Community property systems exist only
in states that have enacted them by statute. 15 8
interest in forfeiture and the innocent owner's interest in the defendant property
should be balanced. Id.
151. Id. at 77-78. The court stated that the innocent spouse would retain ex-
clusive use and possession of the home during her lifetime. Id. at 78. The court
also protected the innocent spouse against conveyances without her consent or
attempts to levy upon any interests formerly held by the guilty spouse. Id. More-
over, if the guilty spouse predeceased the innocent spouse, the court held that she
would have the right to obtain title to the property in fee simple absolute. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. The court also rejected the defendants' argument that 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a) (7) requires an outright denial of forfeiture. Id. The court stated that this
approach "completely frustrates" the government's interest in forfeiture. Id.
154. Id. The court noted that it may be several years before the guilty spouse
acquires a separate interest in the property. Id. Such a delay would make proof of
the facts supporting a forfeiture difficult or impossible to prove. Id.
155. Id. at 77.
156. McNabney v. McNabney, 782 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Nev. 1984).
157. 41 CJ.S. Husband and Wife § 122 (1991).
158. Id. See generally Blackman v. Blackman, 43 P.2d 1011, 1013-17 (Ariz.
1935) (discussing development of community property statutes).
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Community property systems recognize two categories of marital
property: community property and separate property.' 59 All property ac-
quired by either spouse during the marriage is community property.'
60
Separate property is defined as "property owned by a married person in
his or her own right during marriage."' 6 1 Generally, all property acquired
by either spouse prior to marriage, and all property acquired by either
spouse during the marriage by gift, devise, bequest or descent is separate
property. 162
Each spouse owns an undivided one-half interest in the community
property acquired during the marriage.1 63 Additionally, each spouse pos-
sesses an equal right to manage and control community property. 16 4 Con-
sequently, one spouse cannot alienate or dispose of community property
without obtaining the other spouse's consent.' 6 5 This "community" be-
tween spouses may only be terminated as provided for by statute.' 66
Currently, there are eight community property states.' 6 7 Only one
federal court sitting in one of these states has addressed the issue of
whether the government can forfeit community property when one spouse
qualifies as an innocent owner under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7) and the other
spouse violates the statute.' 68
In United States v. South 23.19 Acres of Land,169 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that the community
property may be sold, with the government and the innocent spouse each
159. 41 CJ.S. Husband and Wife § 128 (1991). The distinction between com-
munity property and separate property is important because it determines the
remedies and processes available for the maintenance of the rights incident to the
property. Id.
160. Id. § 130. Property specifically designated as separate by statute is ex-
cepted from this general rule. Id.
161. Id. § 128. Separate property may be acquired by a spouse only as set
forth by statute. Id.
162. Id. §§ 129, 136. Arizona incorporates these general rules into its commu-
nity property statute. SeeAiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1991) (stating that "[a]ll
property acquired by either husband or wife during the marriage, except that
which is acquired by gift, devise or descent, is the community property of the hus-
band and wife").
163. 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 157 (1991); see also United States v. South
23.19 Acres of Land, 694 F. Supp. 1252, 1254 (E.D. La. 1988) (stating that, under
Louisiana law, each spouse owns undivided one-half interest in community prop-
erty) (citing LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (West 1985)).
164. 41 CJ.S. Husband and Wife § 158 (1991). However, some state statutes
allow each spouse acting alone to manage or control community property. Id.
165. Id. § 168.
166. Id. § 178. Thus, if not explicitly allowed by statute, spouses may not ter-
minate the community by mutual consent. Id.
167. IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., F~mri LAW 214 (2d ed. 1991). These eight states
are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Wash-
ington. Id.
168. See United States v. South 23.19 Acres of Land, 694 F. Supp. 1252, 1253
(E.D. La. 1988) (construing Louisiana community property law).
169. Id.
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taking one half of the sale proceeds.' 70 The court based its holding on
article 2345 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which" 'specifically provides that
a separate obligation [of either the husband or wife] may be satisfied dur-
ing the existence of a community property regime from community prop-
erty,' and it does not distinguish separate debts of the wife from separate
debts of the husband." 17' The court in 23.19 Acres reasoned that if a
spouse's separate obligation may be satisfied from community property,
then a forfeiture of one spouse's interest in community property may also
be satisfied from community property. 172 The court also cited article 2336
of the Louisiana Civil Code, which provides that each spouse owns an un-
divided one-half interest in the community property of the marriage. 173
Based on these two Civil Code articles, the court in 23.19 Acres held that
the government was entitled to an order that the community property be
sold and that the proceeds of the sale be divided between the government
and the innocent spouse.174
C. States Not Recognizing Tenancy by the Entirety or Community
Property Principles
In states that do not recognize tenancy by the entirety or community
property principles, forfeiture cases brought under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7),
where one spouse claims innocent ownership and the other spouse vio-
lates the statute, often address whether the spouse claiming to be an inno-
cent owner has standing to assert the innocent owner defense.' 75 In order
170. Id. at 1254. The defendant property in 23.19 Acres was the community
property of Wayne and Ann Young. Id. at 1253. Wayne Young was convicted
under two federal criminal statutes for possessing with intent to distribute mari-
juana. Id. The government then instituted a forfeiture proceeding against the
property. Id. Ann Young claimed to be an innocent owner, and the government
did not dispute her claim. Id. at 1254.
171. Id. (quoting Pan American Import Co. v. Buck, 440 So. 2d 182, 188 (La.
Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied in part and granted in part, 445 So. 2d 445, rev'd on other
grounds, 452 So. 2d 1167 (La. 1984)).
172. Id.
173. United States v. South 23.19 Acres of Land, 694 F. Supp. 1252, 1254
(E.D. La. 1988).
174. Id. The court in 23.19 Acres noted that, if community property could not
be divided to satisfy a forfeiture, then the property of married drug traffickers in
community property states would be insulated from forfeiture. Id. The court
stated that "[s] tate family and property laws cannot supercede and interfere with
the uniform application of federal forfeiture law to produce such a result." Id.
(citing United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 683 (1983)).
175. See, e.g., United States v. 717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d 529, 535-36 (3d Cir.
1993) (deciding whether spouse claiming innocent ownership had standing to as-
sert defense as to property titled in husband's name under Pennsylvania law);
United States v. 116 Emerson St., 942 F.2d 74, 78-79 (1st Cir. 1991) (addressing
same issue under Rhode Island law); United States v. 1419 Mount Alto Rd., 830 F.
Supp. 1476, 1480-83 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (addressing same issue under Georgia law);
United States v. 5854 N. Kenmore, 762 F. Supp. 204, 209-10 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (ad-
dressing same issue under Illinois law); United States v. East Half Section 12, 131
F.R.D. 171, 173-74 (D. Neb. 1990) (addressing same issue under Nebraska law).
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to have standing to assert the innocent owner defense, a claimant must be
an "owner" of the subject property. 176 The term "owner" is broadly con-
strued to encompass" 'any person with a recognizable legal or equitable
interest in the property seized.' "177 Courts look to state laws to determine
whether a claimant has an interest in the subject property.178
The common situation presented in these forfeiture cases is that the
spouse claiming innocent ownership attempts to establish an ownership
interest in property tided in the name of the spouse violating the stat-
ute. 179 Spouses claiming innocent ownership advance several theories to
establish an ownership interest in property titled in the name of the guilty
spouse, including: equitable distribution statutes, 180 gift,' 8 1 oral con-
tract,' 82 constructive trust,1 83 resulting trust'8 4 and survival statutes. 185
1. Equitable Distribution Statutes
A number of federal courts have decided cases involving the issue of
whether a spouse asserting the innocent owner defense may establish an
ownership interest under a state's equitable distribution statute. In United
States v. 717 South Woodward Street,186 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit rejected the argument that Pennsylvania's equitable
distribution statute conferred an ownership interest sufficient to satisfy the
standing requirement in a forfeiture case. 18 7 The court in 717 Woodward
176. 717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d at 535 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7)).
177. Id. (quoting United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d 98, 102 (3d
Cir. 1991), aff d, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993)). For a more detailed discussion of what
constitutes "ownership" for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 881, see supra note 44.
178. See, e.g., 1419 Mount Alto Rd., 830 F. Supp. at 1480 (noting that state law
determines interest of claimant); 5854 N. Kenmore, 762 F. Supp. at 209 (stating that
"property issues concerning ownership are governed by the laws of the state in
which the property is located").
179. See, e.g., 717S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d at 535 (noting that wife claimed own-
ership interest in property where husband was sole record owner).
180. See, e.g., id. at 535-36 (discussing wife's claim under Pennsylvania's equi-
table distribution statute that she had ownership interest in property subject to
forfeiture).
181. See United States v. 1419 Mount Alto Rd., 830 F. Supp. 1476, 1482 (N.D.
Ga. 1993) (evaluating wife's theory that she received valid gift of one-half interest
in property subject to forfeiture).
182. See id. at 1482-83 (assessing wife's argument that oral contract gave her
one-half interest in property subject to forfeiture).
183. See id. at 1481-82 (discussing wife's claim that constructive trust in subject
property existed).
184. See, e.g., United States v. 5854 N. Kenmore, 762 F. Supp. 204, 209 (N.D.
Ill. 1991) (analyzing wife's assertion that she had resulting trust in defendant
property).
185. See United States v. East Half Section 12, 131 F.R.D. 171, 174 (D. Neb.
1990) (discussing whether survival statute gave wife interest in subject property).
186. 2 F.3d 529 (3d Cir. 1993).
187. Id. at 536. Pennsylvania's equitable distribution statute, located at 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3501 (1991), provides that" 'marital property' means all prop-
erty acquired by either party during the marriage." Id. at 535. The spouse claim-
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Street stated that "[t] he primary objective of... [the equitable distribution
statute] is clearly to designate the property that is subject to disposition by
the court in a divorce proceeding."188 The court also noted that the
Pennsylvania Superior Court declined to find that the statute confers an
ownership interest outside the context of equitable distribution. 189 The
Third Circuit refused to hold that Pennsylvania's equitable distribution
statute conferred an ownership interest upon a spouse claiming to be an
innocent owner in a forfeiture action.' 90 Other federal courts considering
this issue have reached the same conclusion.' 91
2.Gift
In United States v. 1419 Mount Alto Road,'92 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that a spouse claiming
innocent ownership could establish an interest sufficient for standing pur-
poses by virtue of a valid oral gift.' 93 The spouse claiming innocent own-
ership in 1419 Mount Alto Road asserted that she had an agreement with
her husband that she would receive a one-half undivided interest in the
defendant property in exchange for her help in completing the home lo-
cated on the property. 194 Relying on this agreement, the claimant moved
into the home and invested her time, labor and money in completing the
home. 19 5 The court in 1419 Mount Alto Road held that, based on these
facts, the spouse claiming innocent ownership received a valid gift of a
one-half undivided interest in the property under Georgia law. 196
ing innocent ownership, Wyrma Rivera, argued that she had an ownership interest
in her husband's property under the definition of "marital property." Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not con-
sider this issue. Id.
190. Id. at 536. The court based its holding, in part, upon the decisions of
other federal courts, which rejected the application of other states' equitable distri-
bution statutes to forfeiture actions. Id. For a discussion of these other cases, see
infra note 191.
191. See United States v. 116 Emerson St., 942 F.2d 74, 79 n.3 (lst Cir. 1991)
(noting that Rhode Island's equitable distribution statute was improper basis for
wife's claim because it applies "only to the assignment of property interests be-
tween husband and wife during divorce proceedings"); United States v. 5854 N.
Kenmore, 762 F. Supp. 204, 208-09 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that wife had no
property interest in subject property under Illinois Marriage and Dissolution Act
because "the Act is concerned with what constitutes marital property at the time of
the dissolution of a marriage").
192. 830 F. Supp. 1476 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
193. Id. at 1482.
194. Id. at 1479. The claimant's husband purchased the subject property
before the marriage, and legal title was in his name. Id. at 1480. The individuals
made the agreement at the time of the marriage, when the home located on the
property was "an unfinished shell." Id. at 1479.
. 195. Id. at 1479, 1482. Claimant's husband intended to execute a deed grant-
ing claimant a one-half interest in the property, but he never did. Id. at 1479.
196. Id. at 1482. The court stated that all the elements necessary for an oral
gift of land under Georgia law had been shown. Id. These elements are (1) the
1994] 1375
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3. Oral Contract
The court in 1419 Mount Alto Road held that the same agreement that
formed the basis of the gift of a one-half interest in the defendant prop-
erty also constituted an oral contract for a one-half interest in the prop-
erty. 1 9 7 The court in 1419 Mount Alto Road stated that, under Georgia law,
[t] he specific performance of a parol contract as to land shall be
decreed if the defendant admits the contract or if the contract
has been so far executed by the party seeking relief and at the
instance or by the inducements of the other party that if the con-
tract were abandoned he could not be restored to his former
position.1
98
The claimant's husband admitted that an agreement concerning the land
had been made, and the claimant made valuable improvements to the
property in reliance on this agreement.1 99 Thus, the court in 1419 Mount
Alto Road held that, for purposes of standing, the claimant had a sufficient
interest in the defendant property pursuant to an oral contract.
200
4. Constructive Trust
The court in 1419 Mount Alto Road further held that the spouse claim-
ing innocent ownership proved an ownership interest in the defendant
property sufficient for standing under a constructive trust theory.20 1 The
court stated that, under Georgia law, a constructive trust arises" 'whenever
the circumstances are such that the person holding legal title to property
... cannot enjoy the beneficial interest in the property without violating
some established principle of equity.' ",202 In this case, the spouse claim-
ing innocent ownership expended time, labor and money in completing
the home located on the defendant property. 20 3 Because the claimant
made these expenditures in reliance on an agreement with her husband
promise to give, (2) a meritorious consideration, (3) an entry into possession in
pursuance of the gift and (4) the making of valuable improvements on faith of the
gift. Id. The court in 1419 Mount Alto Road noted that the existence of a gift was
ultimately a question of fact, but concluded that for purposes of standing, a suffi-
cient interest in the defendant property had been shown. Id.
197. United States v. 1419 Mount Alto Road, 830 F. Supp. 1476, 1483 (N.D.
Ga. 1993).
198. Id. at 1482-83 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-131 (a) (1982)). The court
stated that although the quoted language's code section did not set forth the rule
of decision in the case, it did set forth the standard to be utilized for adjudicating
the claimant's position. Id. at 1483.
199. Id. The court noted that the oral agreement determined all of the claim-
ant's actions. Id.
200. Id.
201. United States v. 1419 Mount Alto Rd., 830 F. Supp. 1476, 1482 (N.D. Ga.
1993).
202. Id. at 1481 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-93 (1982)).
203. Id. at 1479. The claimant's husband held legal title to the defendant
property. Id. at 1480.
1376 [Vol. 39: p. 1351
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that she would receive a one-half interest in the property, 20 4 the court in
1419 Mount Alto Road concluded that "it would be unjust enrichment to
the value of the property if [c]laimant... failed to receive the promised
return." 2
05
5. Resulting Trust
Two federal court holdings indicate that a spouse asserting the inno-
cent owner defense may establish an ownership interest in the defendant
property by proving the existence of a resulting trust in the property.2 0 6 In
United States v. 5854 North Kenmore,2 0 7 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois found that a spouse claiming innocent
ownership presented sufficient evidence to suggest that she had a result-
ing trust in the defendant property.20 8 The court stated that, under Illi-
nois law, a resulting trust arises when one person's money is invested in
property, but title is taken by another.2 0 9 A resulting trust may also arise
when one person pays only part of the purchase price of property, in
which case the resulting trust will be proportionate to the amount of the
purchase price paid.2 10 In 5854 North Kenmore, the spouse asserting the
innocent owner defense presented evidence that she shared the mortgage
payments, taxes and building expenses with her husband even though title
to the property was in his name. 2 11 The court in 5854 North Kenmore held
that her long-term contributions to the property were evidence of a result-
ing trust under Illinois law.2 12
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
United States v. 116 Emerson Street2 13 affirmed a district court finding of a
resulting trust when the spouse, claiming to be an innocent owner, made
long-term contributions to the defendant property. 214 In 116 Emerson
Street, the defendant property was registered under the name of the hus-
204. Id. at 1481. For a further discussion of the agreement between the
spouse claiming innocent ownership and her husband, see supra note 194 and
accompanying text.
205. Id.
206. See United States v. 116 Emerson St., 942 F.2d 74, 79-80 (1st Cir. 1991);
United States v. 5854 N. Kenmore, 762 F. Supp. 204, 209 (N.D. 111. 1991). For a
further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 207-18.
207. 762 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
208. Id. at 209. The wife claimed innocent ownership and the husband's es-
tate held title to the defendant property. Id. at 208.
209. Id. at 209 (citing In re Estate of Jarodsky, 258 N.E.2d 365 (Ill. App. Ct.
1970)).
210. Id. (citing In re Estate of Jarodsky, 258 N.E.2d 365 (Il. App. Ct. 1970)).
211. Id.
212. United States v. 5854 North Kenmore, 762 F. Supp. 204, 209 (N.D. Ill.
1991). The court noted, however, that its findings were not conclusive and re-
quested that the parties brief the issue so that the question of standing could be
finally resolved. Id.
213. 942 F.2d 74 (1st Cir. 1991).
214. Id. at 79-80.
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band.2 15 In the district court, the wife claimed innocent ownership and
testified that she had an agreement with her husband that he would pay
the down payment on the property, she would pay the mortgage, and they
would share ownership of the property.2 16 The wife also offered cancelled
money orders to prove that she paid the mortgage.2 17 Based on this evi-
dence, the district court found that the wife had a resulting trust in the
defendant property, and the First Circuit affirmed.2 18
6. Survival Statutes
A final basis for spouses to assert the innocent owner defense is pursu-
ant to a survival statute. In United States v. East Half Section 12,219 the
United States District Court for the District of Nebraska held that Ne-
braska's survival statute gave a wife an interest in her husband's property
sufficient to give her standing to assert the innocent owner defense in a
forfeiture action. 220 The court held that the Nebraska statute "gives a sur-
viving spouse the right to take a share of a deceased spouse's real estate, in
lieu of what he or she may receive under a will."22 1 In addition, the court
in East Half cited the Nebraska Supreme Court's holding that the surviving
spouse's right gave a wife "'an interest in the real estate of her husband
which he cannot alienate without her consent.' ",222 The East Half court
concluded that the wife claiming innocent ownership had an interest in
the defendant property sufficient to give her standing.22 3
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The forfeiture cases discussed in the preceding section of this Com-
ment fall into two basic categories. First, in states that recognize tenancy by
the entirety or community property principles, the forfeiture cases in
which one spouse raised the innocent owner defense focused on what in-
terest, if any, of the innocent spouse is forfeitable to the government. Sec-
ond, in states not recognizing tenancy by the entirety or community
property principles, the forfeiture cases in which one spouse raised the
215. Id. at 79.
216. Id. The down payment on the property was $8000, and the mortgage was
$8000. Id.
217. Id.
218. United States v. 116 Emerson St., 942 F.2d 74, 79-80 (1st Cir. 1991). The
Court of Appeals in 116 Emerson Street stated that "[t] here was ample evidence sup-
porting the district court's decision." Id. at 80.
219. 131 F.R.D. 171 (D. Neb. 1990).
220. Id. at 174.
221. Id. (citing NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2313 (1989)).
222. Id. (quoting Sadler v. Sadler, 167 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Neb. 1969)). The
court also cited a federal decision from South Carolina that indicated that a statute
providing for property distribution between spouses could create an interest suffi-
cient to give a spouse standing in a forfeiture action. Id. (citing United States v.
Trafalgar St., 700 F. Supp. 857, 862 n.5 (D.S.C. 1988)).
223. Id.
1378 [Vol. 39: p. 1351
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innocent owner defense focused on whether the innocent spouse had a
sufficient ownership interest in the defendant property to confer standing
to assert the innocent owner defense.
Federal courts adjudicating forfeiture cases in states recognizing ten-
ancy by the entirety or community property principles employ a balancing
test.22 4 In resolving the issue of what interest of the innocent spouse is
forfeitable to the government, these courts seek the result that best serves
both the governmental interest in forfeiting property used in violation of
drug laws and the interest of innocent spouses in preserving their property
rights.2 25
Federal courts adjudicating forfeiture cases in states not recognizing
tenancy by the entirety or community property principles, on the other
hand, are confronted with the task of determining whether innocent
spouses have standing to assert the innocent owner defense in the first
place. 22 6 In making this determination, these courts evaluate the merits
of the various theories innocent spouses advance in order to establish an
ownership interest in property titled in the name of the guilty spouse.
2 27
The following three sections of this Comment evaluate the federal courts'
holdings in forfeiture cases in states that recognize tenancy by the entirety,
community property principles and, finally, states that do not recognize
either tenancy by the entirety or community property principles.
224. See, e.g., United States v. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d 73, 77 (3d Cir.
1991) (stating that "nothing in the legislative history discloses precisely how Con-
gress wanted to balance the interest in forfeiture and the interest of an innocent
owner in the circumstances presented by the case now before us"); United States v.
2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 348-49 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that, while
"[f]orfeiture statutes serve the ends of law enforcement by... rendering illegal
behavior unprofitable," they are also "intended to impose a penalty only upon
those who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise"), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
947 (1991); United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1518 (11th Cir.
1990) (stating that "even though the goal of enacting [§ ] 881(a) (7) was to reach
[drug traffickers'] property and forfeit it to the government ... Congress equally
intended full protection of the interest of innocent owners").
225. See, e.g., 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d at 77 (stating that "we believe that we
should adopt the interpretation that best serves the two goals that 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (a) (7) was intended to promote"); 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1513 (beginning
analysis of case by noting "two interrelated aims of Congress" reflected in language
of § 881(a) (7)).
226. See, e.g., United States v. 1419 Mount Alto Rd., 830 F. Supp. 1476, 1479
(N.D. Ga. 1993) (stating that issue before court is claimant's standing to assert
innocent owner defense). For a brief discussion of other cases addressing this is-
sue, see supra note 175.
227. See, e.g., United States v. 717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d 529, 535-36 (3d Cir.
1993) (evaluating wife's claim that she had ownership interest in defendant prop-
erty under equitable distribution statute); 1419 Mount Alto Rd., 830 F. Supp. at
1480-83 (assessing wife's argument that she had ownership interest in defendant
property under theories of gift, oral contract and constructive trust); United States
v. 5854 N. Kenmore, 762 F. Supp. 204, 209 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (evaluating wife's asser-
tion that she had resulting trust in subject property); United States v. East Half
Section 12, 131 F.RD. 171, 174 (D. Neb. 1990) (analyzing wife's theory that she
acquired ownership interest in defendant property through survival statute).
29
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A. Tenancy by the Entirety
Balancing the government's interest in forfeiting property used in vio-
lation of drug laws with the interest of innocent spouses in preserving
their property rights is particularly difficult in cases arising in states that
recognize tenancy by the entirety. This difficulty arises because the lan-
guage of the innocent owner defense protects an innocent owner's inter-
est in the defendant property,22 8 while the law of tenancy by the entirety
provides that each spouse is considered the owner of the whole prop-
erty.229 Thus, it would appear that when property subject to forfeiture is
owned as a tenancy by the entirety and one spouse asserts the innocent
owner defense, no interest in the property remains to be forfeited to the
government.230 This argument, however, ignores the strong governmen-
tal interest in using forfeiture to combat drug trafficking in the United
States. 231
As previously noted, the decisions of the five federal courts that ad-
dress whether the government can forfeit property held by spouses as ten-
ants by the entirety when one spouse is an innocent owner under 21
U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7) and the other spouse violates the statute fall into three
categories.2 32 Of the three different approaches federal courts take on
this issue, the Third Circuit's approach in United States v. 1500 Lincoln Ave-
nue233 best balances the government's interest in forfeiture with the inno-
cent spouse's interest in preserving his or her property rights.
In 1500 Lincoln Avenue, the Third Circuit served the government's in-
terest in forfeiture by immediately forfeiting the guilty spouse's interest in
the defendant property.23 4 At the same time, the court also protected the
228. The innocent owner defense of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) provides that "no
property shall be forfeited ... to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted with-
out the knowledge or consent of that owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) (1988) (em-
phasis added).
229. See, e.g., United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 346 (6th Cir.
1990) (stating that "[i] n a true tenancy by the entireties, each spouse is considered
to own the whole" (quoting Rogers v. Rogers, 356 N.W.2d 288, 292-93 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1984)), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947 (1991). The law of tenancy by the entirety
also provides that neither spouse has an individual, separate interest which may be
conveyed, encumbered or alienated. Id.
230. See, e.g., United States v. Property Entitled in the Names of Alexander
Morio Toki and Elizabeth Mila Toki, 779 F. Supp. 1272, 1275 (D. Haw. 1991) (not-
ing wife's argument that, if she is innocent owner, her rights as tenant by entirety
entitle her to entire property).
231. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374 (stating that purpose of § 881 (a) (7) was "to enhance the
use of forfeiture... in combatting two of the most serious crime problems facing
the country: racketeering and drug trafficking"). The report further noted that
forfeiture was the mechanism through which these crimes could be attacked. Id.
232. For a discussion of these three categories of decisions, see supra notes
107-10 and accompanying text.
233. 949 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1991).
234. Id. at 77.
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property interest of the innocent spouse by giving her a life estate in the
property, which retained all of the property rights she previously had
under the tenancy by the entirety.2 3 5
In a well-reasoned opinion, the court in 1500 Lincoln Avenue rejected
the Eleventh Circuit's approach in United States v. 15621 S.W 209th Ave-
nue,23 6 pointing out two weaknesses in the Eleventh Circuit's opinion.23 7
First, the court stated that the Eleventh Circuit's holding frustrates the
strong governmental interest in forfeiture, allowing guilty spouses to re-
tain their title to entireties property used in drug offenses. 238 Second, the
court pointed out that the Eleventh Circuit's approach creates "substantial
procedural difficulties" because it requires the government to postpone
forfeiture proceedings until the guilty spouse acquires a separate interest
in the entireties property.2 39 The court noted that it may be several years
before the guilty spouse acquires a separate interest in the property, thus
"postponing adjudication of the government's right to forfeiture... until
[that] time, rather than adjudicating [the] issue when the evidence [is]
still fresh."'24
The "substantial procedural difficulties" of the Eleventh Circuit's test
are illustrated in the Sixth Circuit case United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane.2 41
The first time the Leroy Lane case came before the Sixth Circuit, the court
adopted an approach similar to the Eleventh Circuit's in 209th Avenue.2 42
235. Id. at 77-78. For a complete discussion of these rights, see supra note
151.
236. 894 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1990).
237. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d at 78. The Eleventh Circuit approach, also
adopted by the Sixth and Fourth Circuits, held that no present interest in entire-
ties property could be forfeited to the government, although the government
might acquire an interest in the property at a future time. See United States v. 2525
Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 351-52 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that its opinion was con-
sistent with Eleventh Circuit's approach in 209th Avenue), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947
(1991); 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1516 n.6 (recognizing possibility that government
might acquire interest in later forfeiture action); United States v. 35 Acres, No. 90-
7376, 1991 WL 154348, at *2 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 1991) (same). For a discussion of
these cases, see supra notes 112-41 and accompanying text.
238. United States v. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d 73, 78 (3d Cir. 1991). The
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii's approach also frustrates the
government's interest in the forfeiture of property used in drug offenses. United
States v. Property Entitled in the Names of Alexander Morio Toki and Elizabeth
Mila Toki, 779 F. Supp. 1272, 1284-85 (D. Haw. 1991). In Toki, the court held that
the government cannot obtain any interest (either present or future) in entireties
property when one spouse is an innocent owner. Id. at 1284. For a full discussion
of Toki, see supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
239. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d at 78. The Eleventh Circuit held that the
government could file a lis pendens against the property and acquire the guilty
pouse's interest in a later forfeiture proceeding should the entireties estate be
ered in the future. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1516 n.6.
240. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d at 78.
241. 972 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 1992).
242. See United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 351 (6th Cir. 1990)
(holding that government acquired interest is analogous to judgment creditor of
guilty spouse when it seeks forfeiture of property held as tenancy by the entirety,
1994] COMMENT 1381
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While this first forfeiture proceeding was still pending, the spouses ob-
tained a divorce in a state court.243 The Sixth Circuit then remanded the
case to the district court, which awarded all of the proceeds of the entire-
ties property to the innocent spouse based upon the divorce decree.2
4 4
The government appealed this district court decision, bringing the case
before the Sixth Circuit for a second time.245 The Sixth Circuit again re-
manded the case to the district court, "to insure total disclosure.., of all
facts surrounding the entry of the divorce decree."246 The Third Circuit's
approach in 1500 Lincoln Avenue avoids this type of protracted litigation.
B. Community Property
Balancing the government's interest in forfeiture with the interest of
innocent spouses in preserving their property rights is far less difficult in
cases arising in states that recognize community property principles be-
cause, in community property states, each spouse owns an undivided one-
half interest in the community property of the marriage. 247 Thus, in
United States v. South 23.19 Acres of Land,248 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana ordered that the community property
be sold, with the government and the innocent spouse each taking one
half of the proceeds of the sale.249
The court in 23.19 Acres, however, also based its holding on article
2345 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which allows the separate obligations of
one spouse to be satisfied from community property.250 The court stated
that, even if community property could not be divided to satisfy a forfei-
ture, such a law would not prevent the forfeiture of the property.2 5 1 This
statement suggests that even if Louisiana's community property law was
and other spouse was innocent owner), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947 (1991). For a
more complete discussion of the first Leroy Lane case, see supra notes 131-41 and
accompanying text.
243. Leroy Lane, 972 F.2d at 137.
244. Id. The divorce decree awarded the entireties property solely to the in-
nocent spouse. Id.
245. Id. at 138.
246. Id. at 138-39.
247. See 41 CJ.S. Husband and Wife § 157 (1991) (stating that "[b]oth spouses
have a right to one-half of the community property derived from their marriage,
and each spouse owns an undivided one-half interest in the whole community real
estate") (footnotes omitted).
248. 694 F. Supp. 1252 (E.D. La. 1988).
249. Id. at 1254.
250. Id. (citing LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 2345 (West 1985)).
251. Id. The court stated,
[i]f it were the law that community property cannot be divided to satisfy a
forfeiture, married drug traffickers in community property states would
automatically have all their unlawfully gained property immediately insu-
lated. State family and property laws cannot supercede and interfere with
the uniform application of federal forfeiture law to produce such a result.
Id. (citing United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 683 (1983)); see also United
States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1516 n.5 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting
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different, the court in 23.19 Acres would have reached the same result,
balancing the government's interest in forfeiture with the innocent
spouse's property interest.2 52 This approach is similar to the approach
taken by the Third Circuit in 1500 Lincoln Avenue.
C. States Not Recognizing Tenancy by the Entirety or
Community Property Principles
The common situation presented in cases arising in states that do not
recognize either tenancy by the entirety or community property principles
is that of the innocent spouse trying to establish an ownership interest in
property titled in the name of the guilty spouse. In these situations, the
innocent spouse must prove an ownership interest in the property to have
standing to assert the innocent owner defense because title to the property
is in the name of the guilty spouse.255 As previously noted, innocent
spouses successfully assert an ownership interest in property titled in the
name of the guilty spouse under the theories of gift, oral contract, con-
structive trust, resulting trust and survival statutes.254 Spouses asserting an
ownership interest under state equitable distribution statutes, however, are
not successful. 255
The situation presented in the cases where the innocent spouse must
establish an ownership interest illustrates the harshness of the common-
that court in 23.19 Acres "opined that forfeiture could take place even if state law
would not permit the division of community property to satisfy a forfeiture").
252. The court's assertion that state law should not operate to insulate the
property of married drug traffickers in community property states suggests that the
governmental interest in forfeiture would outweigh a spouse's right to prevent the
division of community property to satisfy a forfeiture. See United States v. South
23.19 Acres of Land, 694 F. Supp. 1252, 1254 (E.D. La. 1988) (holding that state
"property laws cannot supercede and interfere with uniform application of federal
forfeiture laws").
253. See, e.g., United States v. 717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d 529, 535 (3d Cir.
1993) (stating that claimant must be owner of property in order to have standing
to assert innocent owner defense). For a further discussion of the standing re-
quirement, see supra note 175 and accompanying text.
254. See United States v. 116 Emerson St., 942 F.2d 74, 79-80 (1st Cir. 1991)
(holding that innocent spouse had resulting trust in defendant property); United
States v. 1419 Mount Alto Rd., 830 F. Supp. 1476, 1480-83 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (hold-
ing that innocent spouse had ownership interest in property tided in name of
guilty spouse under theories of gift, oral contract and constructive trust); United
States v. 5854 N. Kenmore, 762 F. Supp. 204, 209 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (same); United
States v. East Half Section 12, 131 F.R.D. 171, 174 (D. Neb. 1990) (holding that
state survival statute gave innocent spouse interest in guilty spouse's property). For
a further discussion of these cases, see supra notes 192-223 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., 717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d at 536 (rejecting argument that Penn-
sylvania's equitable distribution statute conferred ownership interest upon spouse
claiming to be innocent owner in forfeiture action). For a further discussion of
this case and other cases rejecting the use of equitable distribution statutes to es-
tablish an ownership interest, see supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
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law title system of property ownership.2 56 Under the title system, the per-
son whose name appears on the tile to property is presumed to be the
owner of that property.2 5 7 Thus, unless an innocent spouse (whose name
is not on the title) can prove an ownership interest in the property under
a theory accepted by the court, all of the property will be forfeited to the
government.25 8 This result does not provide adequate protection for in-
nocent spouses.
Alternatively, an approach allowing courts to consider the contribu-
tion of the innocent spouse to the acquisition, maintenance and increase
in value of the property would provide greater protection to innocent
spouses.25 9 Such an approach would ameliorate the harsh results of forfei-
ture in cases where an innocent spouse is unable to prove an ownership
interest in the property under a theory such as gift or trust.
260
V. CONCLUSION
Innocent spouses often raise the innocent owner defense of 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a) (7) in an attempt to prevent the forfeiture of marital property
due to the narcotics-related offenses of their spouses. Federal courts adju-
dicating these forfeiture cases in states that recognize tenancy by the en-
256. The common-law title system of property ownership assumes that each
spouse owns the property he or she earns. ELLMAN, supra note 166, at 223. The
community property system, on the other hand, "assumes an equal partnership
between spouses, regardless of whose labors accounted directly for the acquisition
of any particular asset." Id.
257. See id. at 233 (noting that "underlying premise" of common-law title sys-
tem is that "property is owned by the spouse who earned it"). In addition, "each
spouse has sole management authority over the property each aquires with his or
her earnings, except to the extent they explicitly place it in some form of joint
ownership." Id.
258. See, e.g., United States v. 717 South Woodward St., 2 F.3d 529, 536 (3d
Cir. 1993) (holding that innocent spouse could not assert forfeiture statute's inno-
cent owner defense because she lacked ownership interest in property under
Pennsylvania's equitable distribution statute).
259. Courts in states following the common-law tide system of property own-
ership frequently consider spousal contributions to marital property when allocat-
ing marital property under equitable distribution laws. ELLMAN, supra note 166, at
237. Many states have statutes providing for consideration of spousal contribution
in the equitable distribution of property. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502
(1991) (providing for consideration of"[(t] he contribution ... of each party in the
acquisition, preservation ... or appreciation of the marital property, including the
contribution of a party as homemaker"); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-32 (1992) (providing
for consideration of spousal contributions to acquisition of property, including
services as homemaker).
260. Because many innocent spouses may have difficulty in proving all of the
elements required under a theory such as gift or trust, allowing courts to consider
the contributions of innocent spouses to marital property will increase the likeli-
hood that innocent spouses will be found to have an ownership interest in the
property sufficient to confer standing to assert the innocent owner defense. This
approach would provide greater protection to innocent spouses and decrease the
number of cases in which all of the marital property is forfeited to the government,
leaving the innocent spouse with nothing.
1384
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tirety or community property principles reach varying conclusions when
deciding what interest, if any, of an innocent spouse is forfeitable to the
government. Meanwhile, federal courts in states that do not recognize
tenancy by the entirety or community property principles focus on the
different theories innocent spouses may use to establish standing to raise
the innocent owner defense. This Comment has provided a comprehen-
sive survey of how federal courts have dealt with the range of issues and
decisions in this area.
Allison A. Cornelius
35
Cornelius: Civil Forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(7): The Problem of the In
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [1994], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss5/6
